The much-trailed UK Strategic Defence Review (SDR) was published yesterday. It was timely for me as I was participating in a European seminar on how Europe should respond to the new strategic situation.
There is a lot of narrative (some have called it a think piece) in the Defence Review, rather than detailed plans. It's undoubtedly a coherent read, probably the best I have read, and for the critics who focus on detail, the hint is in the title - it’s strategic. It will inform further plans. The commitments include:
· £1.5bn to build six new factories to enable an "always on" munitions production capacity.
· Building up to 7,000 long-range weapons, including missiles or drones.
· A "cyber and electromagnetic command" to boost the military's defensive and offensive capabilities in cyberspace.
· £1.5bn to 2029 to fund repairs to military housing.
· £1bn on technology to speed up the delivery of targeting information to soldiers.
There was no commitment to significantly increase the number of full-time soldiers, which is sensible given the need to concentrate on meeting the current targets. The same certainly applies to the Royal Navy, which is struggling to staff the surface fleet. Improvements in pay and conditions, as well as the investment in service housing, are crucial to meeting those targets.
Unlike previous defence reviews, there was less emphasis on shiny new equipment. Even the headlines, such as the latest attack submarines, are primarily about replacing existing weapon systems. However, there are still some tough decisions to be made if the UK is to bridge the gap between policy rhetoric and strategic reality. For example, as a recent University of Exeter study asks, “Does an aircraft carrier or a defunct amphibious force with limited air and aviation assets really deter adversaries from acting against the UK or its allies?” Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web has rightly been described as “a defining moment in modern warfare.” One of the big ideas in the SDR, the integrated force with a digital targeting web, is a recognition of the need for change.

Everyone in Europe has woken up to the need for stockpiles, a problem I highlighted last year and one that dates back to the Cold War. Hopefully, the ‘just in time’ era is finally over. The investment in munitions manufacturing is crucial, as at present, we barely produce as much ammunition annually as Russia fires off in Ukraine each day. Strengthening our industrial base is something I highlighted in a paper on defence procurement for Prospect, which has broadly welcomed the SDR. Britain cannot afford to rely on uncertain supply lines during a war. The section on defence procurement is a move in the right direction, but we need to see what this means in practice in the later plans. The detailed emphasis on skills, workforce planning and people is very welcome.

There is a bit of spin on the concept of ‘military Keynesianism’. Jobs and other economic spin-offs, not least R&D, are a welcome by-product, but other forms of public spending deliver higher economic multipliers. However, not as egregious as the Scottish Government pulling the plug on a high-tech training and research centre, led by Rolls-Royce, which has rightly been described as industrial sabotage. Or the excitable performance from the Tory Shadow Defence Minister in the Commons, who has forgotten that this review is starting to tidy up the mess they left behind.
The SDR gives a credible and detailed breakdown of the threats facing the UK. There is a welcome shift from the imperial strategy of the Johnson Government. It also reflects a much stronger relationship with our European partners. This was evident in the seminar I participated in, where most countries reported similar policy shifts. However, almost everyone indicated that this is not a massive shift – the proposed changes are relatively modest, relying on Russia’s need to rebuild after the Ukraine war. For example, the spending commitments in the UK and Europe are not huge and are spread out over many years. In the UK, 20% of the MoD budget is spent on Defence Nuclear Enterprise, which, whatever position you take on those weapons, is a big chunk out of conventional capacity. Even the much-vaunted German policy is not quite as substantial as the spin. Current and immediate funding plans won’t do much more than paper over the cracks caused by 30 years of underinvestment. Lord Dannatt’s comment may be a little harsh, but he has a point.

There was a concern at my seminar, particularly from countries in Eastern Europe, that this may be misguided. The Russian economy has been militarised to an extent that is not fully appreciated in the West. If a peace deal is agreed, then they would be in a position to attack the Baltic states reasonably quickly. Putin, like Netanyahu, is in a political cycle that almost requires continuous war. The PM is also doing his best to ‘strengthen our bridge to the US’. However, there are few people in Europe at present who regard the USA as a reliable partner, at least while Trump is in office. The PM’s ‘sovereign warhead programme’ may be a tacit recognition of that reality, along with new delivery options. The SDR is typically vague on these issues for the usual reasons, but it ducks the issue of just how independent our nuclear deterrent is.
The Prime Minister claimed his defence blueprint would deliver “A battle-ready, armour-clad nation with the strongest alliances, and the most advanced capabilities – equipped for the decades to come.” I’m not convinced that the UK, or our European allies, are at that stage, but there has been a welcome and significant gear shift.