The Herald has been running a series of articles on ScotRail since it was taken into partial public ownership as the ‘operator of last resort’. As is often the case, the headlines don’t always reflect the content, which is generally good, and the usual suspects have claimed it shows public ownership doesn’t work.
Last September, I wrote a briefing for the Reid Foundation, All Change on the Railways, which looked at ScotRail and the UK Government reforms. This was a warm-up for Mick Lynch's lecture at the Jimmy Reid Memorial Lecture in October 2024. It is worth remembering that under the Tories, only 85.5% of trains ran on time, and many more failed to run at all, not least because industrial disputes were deliberately left unresolved, wasting £1.25bn of taxpayers' money. This was also the case with Abellio in Scotland. Fragmentation, waste and bureaucracy beset privatised rail. While welcoming the decision to bring ScotRail into public ownership, I highlighted several challenges. These included driver shortages, ageing rolling stock, retiring engineering staff, passenger safety, and the need for an integrated transport and ticketing system. These all reflect years of mismanagement, which cannot be fixed in under three years of partial public ownership. ScotRail still operates under the failed franchise model, which has additional costs baked in.
The usual suspects have focused on increased costs, pointing to the grant increase from £446m pre-pandemic (2019/20) to £737m. However, we also know that Abellio was running at a loss above £100m, which they, or another operator, would insist on to keep the franchise running. Then, there is the need to settle the pay disputes, record inflation rates, and other costs associated with the mess Abellio’s desperate cost-cutting caused. Some of us can remember the shambles of the 2018 winter timetable, with months of cancellations and service disruption. So, while it is right to question any cost increases, they must be contextualised.
There is a lot of confusing data in the articles about passenger satisfaction based on different surveys over varying timelines, with some highly subjective questions. For example, what is the difference between 'sometimes' and 'rarely' in relation to delays and cancellations? However, overall performance and passenger satisfaction continue to be better than the GB average and trains in Scotland are more likely to arrive on time. As someone who regularly uses the train, I have to agree. Much was made of cancellation costs (still better since public ownership), but these are anyway mainly outwith the control of ScotRail, either due to the weather or Network Rail issues. A public service operator should ensure that passengers get home, which often means expensive taxis because coaches are not always available. I can recall several lengthy disputes with Abellio, who fiercely resisted paying the actual cost of their service failures - no MSP to complain to then!
ScotRail is also running 75% more services, and while that is slightly down on the pre-pandemic figures, other rail companies have not achieved similar pandemic recovery numbers. There has been a significant shift to home working, which has been encouraged in Scotland, with no Jacob Rees-Mogg leaving cards in civil service offices!
It is no surprise that passengers think rail fares are too high – they are. The peak rail fares pilot scheme boosted demand for ScotRail services by around 6.8%, short of the 10% target. However, this criterion ignores the policy's wider benefits, including two million car journeys taken off our roads.
So, in three years of partial public ownership, services have improved marginally as the Abellio shambles have been patched up. However, that is only part of the story; as Transform Scotland says, a clear, coordinated strategy and long-term investment are needed to ensure railways are a “national success story rather than a symbol of missed opportunity". They criticise the ending of the peak fares scheme and point to the need to adapt services to evolving work and leisure patterns, with greater cohesion between improving rail services and facilitating traffic reduction. The Scottish Government has committed to spending over £6 billion on new road capacity on the corridors from Perth and Aberdeen to Inverness. Yet no similar ambition exists for the parallel rail routes. We have an ageing rail infrastructure and one of the oldest train fleets in Britain. If this sounds familiar to ferry users, it should. Transform argues that the strategy should include simplifying fares, prioritising user experience, improving service reliability, and investing strategically.
