Devolution and the quango state

This week is the 25th anniversary of the first elections to the Scottish Parliament. Commentary typically focuses on how the Parliament has performed and how its procedures can be reformed. While I agree with many of the criticisms, the Scottish Parliament remains the most crucial democratic intervention in Scotland for a generation and more. For those like me who remember the pre-devolution position, the Scottish Parliament remains an outstanding institution. And despite the fractious politics of recent years, the public agrees. In the most recent Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 63 per cent said that having a Scottish Parliament gives ordinary people more of a say in how Scotland is governed, while a similar proportion said it gives Scotland a stronger voice in the UK.

The biggest failure of devolution has been the absence of decentralisation to communities, a vision set out by the Constitutional Convention that has yet to be delivered. The woes of local government are well understood, but another aspect of centralised control, the quango state, is largely ignored. Rather than extending the principle of devolution within Scotland, the Scottish Government has retained all the transfers from Westminster and, in addition, has taken away functions from Local Government. Three-quarters of public spending is directed by Scottish Ministers, including around £23 billion spent by quangos.

This week, the Scotsman is running a welcome series on quangos, which may help shine some much-needed light on these institutions. The early easy targets are management salaries and the usual suspects who serve on them. However, we should ask if this centralised control over many of our public services is the best form of governance. The Scotsman started by struggling to define what the quango state consists of, settling on around 120 bodies. They include Executive Agencies, Non-Departmental Public Bodies (NDPB) and public corporations like Calmac and Scottish Water. They range from small advisory boards to substantial service delivery organisations like Skills Development Scotland and Scottish Enterprise. They include NHS Scotland, but the democratisation of the NHS is a more complex and different debate. The governance models vary, but typically, a board of around 14 people appointed by ministers runs them. 

In 2007, the Scottish Government undertook to simplify the public sector landscape by reducing the number of Scottish public bodies under its control. Like previous governments, they found the 'bonfire of the quangos' difficult to deliver. Ministers often find it useful to have arms-length bodies to deny operational responsibility for poor decisions, which I have previously called the 'not me guv' school of government. The problem is that in the absence of democratic accountability, the public often says, 'It is you guv'. The difficulty is that ministers need more time to scrutinise them, and the sponsoring departments adopt a light touch. The recent Water Industry Commission scandal demonstrates that clearly.

Relationships between NDPBs and their sponsoring departments can also be challenging. A National Audit Office study of English equivalents found that the arm’s-length bodies sector remains ‘confused and incoherent’. Audit Scotland has occasionally forayed into quangos with similar conclusions. Their 2010 paper concluded, ' The make-up of boards and their role has evolved over time rather than as a result of any objective evaluation of the best model for public accountability.’

Suggestions that they could be broken up and delivered locally are resisted because they allegedly benefit from economies of scale or are too specialised to spread the limited expertise around the country. Even attempts to minimise duplication by creating common bargaining structures have been opposed by the agencies and government. 

Options for reform include:

• Identifying all or parts of the services that could be delivered locally while retaining a national framework.

• Greater scrutiny by Parliament.

• Direct elections.

In my paper, Public Service Reform for the Reid Foundation, I set out some principles that should underpin this work. I developed them in a subsequent paper, Building Stronger Communities. The starting point is subsidiarity, building integrated public services from the bottom up and sharing where appropriate. The role of central government should be to set the strategic direction based on outcomes – rather than trying to direct services from Edinburgh. However, a country the size of Scotland cannot justify duplication and difference for the sake of it. Therefore, we need public service frameworks that allow local services to focus on what matters to achieve positive outcomes.

Even where decentralisation is not viable, services should still be required to cooperate locally more effectively than currently. The somewhat loose duties placed on quangos to collaborate in community planning have no effective teeth.

Scotland is one of the most centralised states in Europe. Until we address this centralisation of power, the devolution project will remain unfinished. Reforming the quango state is complex but necessary.